Should Hilary Benn set out clear criteria for the circumstances in which to call a border poll?
I’ve always been among those suggesting that the secretary of state should.
It would hold British feet to the fire over actually calling a poll and give United Irelanders something concrete to focus their energies on.
And at the very least, it allows unionists to see what’s coming down the line so we avoid their inevitable complaints about either the validity of the process or the result.
But now I’m not sure there’s any need.
In fact, I can see advantages in not establishing a series of arbitrary tests.
Let me set out a scenario.
The pro-united Ireland parties cumulatively outperform the pro-UK parties in three straight elections – Westminster, assembly and locals between 2027 and 2029.
Its not about the number of seats won, per se, but the overall share of the vote.
That’s the most obvious and accurate read-across for what might happen in a border poll – and, thus, whether calling one is justified.
The current batting average has unionists winning the most votes in the recent Westminster election – around 43% to 40% – with the rest going to Alliance and the Greens.
In last year’s all-out local elections, nationalists tipped ahead for the first time ever.
While it was virtually even-stevens in the 2022 assembly vote.
So, all to play for next time around, taking us to a likely 2029 British general election.
Next, let’s assume there is a government in Dublin with a stronger commitment to Irish unity than the current one. (We’ll know whether or not this is likely in the next three months, as I predict an early Irish general election this autumn).
This new government’s tenure will run almost concurrently with Keir Starmer’s new administration. Both will face re-election in 2029-30.
Now, let’s say that Dublin takes the view – as it is perfectly entitled to as a co-guarantor of the Good Friday Agreement – that a border poll after 2030 is finally valid, given three sets of elections in the North have shown it ‘likely’ that the electorate there would opt for constitutional change.
How would the British government – ambivalent about Northern Ireland’s constitutional future – then respond?
My hunch is they would look at the results in the North, take a deep breath and then concur with Dublin that there should be a vote.
So British ministers and officials don’t want a series of artificial criteria getting in the way if and when they have a window of opportunity to move quickly and decisively.
That’s partly because they are already operating their own, unofficial criteria.
The first is them knowing – for a fact – that Dublin is ready and willing to take on responsibility for the North. (‘Buyer collects,’ in the argot of ebay).
While the second is whether calling a referendum that might facilitate Northern Ireland leaving the UK is relatively pain-free with British voters. (In various polls, two-thirds are either supportive or don’t much care if Northern Ireland goes).
In short the British calculation is this: ‘Will the Irish deliver?’ and ‘Can we get away with this?’
If you listen carefully, you can already hear the argument being rehearsed.
On only his third day as prime minister, Keir Starter told reporters in Belfast last month that he was ‘absolutely’ committed to honouring the Good Friday Agreement and that his government would act as an ‘honest broker.’
This will be the language used by British ministers when they announce a border poll.
There will be talk of there being a ‘solemn obligation’ on them as ‘custodians’ of the Good Friday Agreement to implement it ‘in all its dimensions.’
As cover, they will point out that they may face a legal challenge if they withhold calling a poll, while reminding critics that whether or not Northern Ireland remains in the UK is solely a matter for the people living there.
And remember this: the provision for calling a border poll in the agreement is only that it is ‘likely’ people will vote for change. It shouldn’t need to cross a 50% threshold in either elections or polling.
And given we know that Alliance and Green voters disproportionately transfer their votes in favour of nationalist parties, this is how the United Ireland column inches ahead in a binary referendum.
Now throw in for good measure the new Labour government’s pledge to reduce the UK’s voting age from 18 to 16 – likely at some stage in this parliament.
We already know there is a yawning gap between the numbers of young Catholics and Protestants, supplying another considerable advantage to United Irelanders.
(And its worth remembering that the motivation for lowering the voting age – which unionists will oppose for the reason just mentioned – has precisely zero to do with the politics of Northern Ireland).
All of which means that if you look carefully, you can see that the choreography for calling a border poll is now becoming visible – so there is no need for Hilary Benn to enunciate a series of theoretical conditions.
So, it goes like this.
Will United Irelanders win the popular vote in three elections before 2029?
Will an Irish government get serious and plan in earnest for an Irish unity referendum by the early 2030s?
Can a British government sell ‘losing’ part of the UK to a domestic audience?
And, finally, and most importantly, will the vote be won first time?
This, then, is the realpolitik about how we arrive at a border poll – and it seems okay to me.
Should Hilary Benn set out clear criteria for the circumstances in which to call a border poll?
I’ve always been among those suggesting that the secretary of state should.
It would hold British feet to the fire over actually calling a poll and give United Irelanders something concrete to focus their energies on.
And at the very least, it allows unionists to see what’s coming down the line so we avoid their inevitable complaints about either the validity of the process or the result.
But now I’m not sure there’s any need.
In fact, I can see advantages in not establishing a series of arbitrary tests.
Let me set out a scenario.
The pro-united Ireland parties cumulatively outperform the pro-UK parties in three straight elections – Westminster, assembly and locals between 2027 and 2029.
Its not about the number of seats won, per se, but the overall share of the vote.
That’s the most obvious and accurate read-across for what might happen in a border poll – and, thus, whether calling one is justified.
The current batting average has unionists winning the most votes in the recent Westminster election – around 43% to 40% – with the rest going to Alliance and the Greens.
In last year’s all-out local elections, nationalists tipped ahead for the first time ever.
While it was virtually even-stevens in the 2022 assembly vote.
So, all to play for next time around, taking us to a likely 2029 British general election.
Next, let’s assume there is a government in Dublin with a stronger commitment to Irish unity than the current one. (We’ll know whether or not this is likely in the next three months, as I predict an early Irish general election this autumn).
This new government’s tenure will run almost concurrently with Keir Starmer’s new administration. Both will face re-election in 2029-30.
Now, let’s say that Dublin takes the view – as it is perfectly entitled to as a co-guarantor of the Good Friday Agreement – that a border poll after 2030 is finally valid, given three sets of elections in the North have shown it ‘likely’ that the electorate there would opt for constitutional change.
How would the British government – ambivalent about Northern Ireland’s constitutional future – then respond?
My hunch is they would look at the results in the North, take a deep breath and then concur with Dublin that there should be a vote.
So British ministers and officials don’t want a series of artificial criteria getting in the way if and when they have a window of opportunity to move quickly and decisively.
That’s partly because they are already operating their own, unofficial criteria.
The first is them knowing – for a fact – that Dublin is ready and willing to take on responsibility for the North. (‘Buyer collects,’ in the argot of ebay).
While the second is whether calling a referendum that might facilitate Northern Ireland leaving the UK is relatively pain-free with British voters. (In various polls, two-thirds are either supportive or don’t much care if Northern Ireland goes).
In short the British calculation is this: ‘Will the Irish deliver?’ and ‘Can we get away with this?’
If you listen carefully, you can already hear the argument being rehearsed.
On only his third day as prime minister, Keir Starter told reporters in Belfast last month that he was ‘absolutely’ committed to honouring the Good Friday Agreement and that his government would act as an ‘honest broker.’
This will be the language used by British ministers when they announce a border poll.
There will be talk of there being a ‘solemn obligation’ on them as ‘custodians’ of the Good Friday Agreement to implement it ‘in all its dimensions.’
As cover, they will point out that they may face a legal challenge if they withhold calling a poll, while reminding critics that whether or not Northern Ireland remains in the UK is solely a matter for the people living there.
And remember this: the provision for calling a border poll in the agreement is only that it is ‘likely’ people will vote for change. It shouldn’t need to cross a 50% threshold in either elections or polling.
And given we know that Alliance and Green voters disproportionately transfer their votes in favour of nationalist parties, this is how the United Ireland column inches ahead in a binary referendum.
Now throw in for good measure the new Labour government’s pledge to reduce the UK’s voting age from 18 to 16 – likely at some stage in this parliament.
We already know there is a yawning gap between the numbers of young Catholics and Protestants, supplying another considerable advantage to United Irelanders.
(And its worth remembering that the motivation for lowering the voting age – which unionists will oppose for the reason just mentioned – has precisely zero to do with the politics of Northern Ireland).
All of which means that if you look carefully, you can see that the choreography for calling a border poll is now becoming visible – so there is no need for Hilary Benn to enunciate a series of theoretical conditions.
So, it goes like this.
Will United Irelanders win the popular vote in three elections before 2029?
Will an Irish government get serious and plan in earnest for an Irish unity referendum by the early 2030s?
Can a British government sell ‘losing’ part of the UK to a domestic audience?
And, finally, and most importantly, will the vote be won first time?
This, then, is the realpolitik about how we arrive at a border poll – and it seems okay to me.