The recent death of the former head of the Irish Forensic Service, Dr Jim Donovan, brought back memories of the role he played in the 1980s in the case of the Birmingham Six.
At that time, I was in the Anglo-Irish Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). With the change of Government from Garret Fitzgerald’s Fine Gael to the more Republican minded Charlie Haughey’s Fianna Fáil, a new broom was sweeping through Iveagh House, the Department’s HQ. This included changes in the assignment of areas of responsibility.
I was assigned the HQ handling of a number of controversial cases, involving Irish men and women in Britain, including the Birmingham Six, Guildford Four, Maguire family, etc.
I inherited the files from another section, and I carefully read through the huge amount of material. I also read a number of books written on the subject. One thing that struck me forcibly was that civil servants and lawyers were giving their personal opinions on the reliability of the forensic evidence in the cases. It also struck me that some of the observations they made lacked credibility.
I had entered the DFA from a scientific background and I personally knew some in our own professional State forensic service, especially the deputy head, Dr Tim Creedon, who had undertaken post graduate research in the Biochemistry Department of Trinity College Dublin at the same time as myself.
I then made the suggestion internally to the head of the Anglo-Irish Division, Dermot Gallagher, that we submit all the information we had on the Birmingham Six case to our own scientists. It had come up for Appeal at that time. They could give us a professional opinion of the strength of the evidence against the Six. Dermot immediately agreed and we got Ministerial approval.
I contacted Tim Creedon, and a meeting was arranged whereby I would show all that was on our files on that case to the head of the Forensic Science Lab, Dr Donovan. The meeting took place at Garda HQ in the Phoenix Park. The Minister for Justice, Gerry Collins, had earlier heard about the meeting and insisted that a representative of his Department be present. This did not cause us any difficulty.
As I began to outline the thrust of the forensics in the Birmingham case, Donovan interjected to say he was very well aware of the details. He then stated bluntly that he believed theforensics in the case did not stand up to scrutiny. Some of it was either forged or totally incompetent. He added that this was widely known internationally among forensic science services. He said that the Birmingham Six case had put a dark cloud over the whole forensics area. It was regarded as a stain on those trying to engender trust and acceptance of forensics.He was emphatic on the subject matter.
I was taken aback at how forthright he was. I asked him how long he had been aware of the situation, and he replied for a considerable length. I asked him why he had not brought his views to the attention of the Government before, and he replied that he was never asked about it until then. I suspect that he also made the calculation that his views may not have been entirely welcome.
The fact somebody as eminent as Donovan made these observations removed any lingering hesitancy about the Government and the Departments of Justice and Foreign Affairs supporting the cases of those who were claiming miscarriages of justice. He had provided forensic evidence in a huge number of cases, including many which led to the conviction of Republican paramilitaries. I also remember discussing the cases some years earlier and having difficulty in convincing a politician that I believed that there was a pattern of miscarriages of justices in these cases. He said to me in all sincerity that “Some of them must be guilty”. After Jim Donovan made his remarks, the doubting Thomases disappeared, and the Irish Government could have no hesitancy on the matter.
It also demonstrates how silos operate within the public service and how damaging they can be to the general good when officials do not share their information.
The recent death of the former head of the Irish Forensic Service, Dr Jim Donovan, brought back memories of the role he played in the 1980s in the case of the Birmingham Six.
At that time, I was in the Anglo-Irish Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). With the change of Government from Garret Fitzgerald’s Fine Gael to the more Republican minded Charlie Haughey’s Fianna Fáil, a new broom was sweeping through Iveagh House, the Department’s HQ. This included changes in the assignment of areas of responsibility.
I was assigned the HQ handling of a number of controversial cases, involving Irish men and women in Britain, including the Birmingham Six, Guildford Four, Maguire family, etc.
I inherited the files from another section, and I carefully read through the huge amount of material. I also read a number of books written on the subject. One thing that struck me forcibly was that civil servants and lawyers were giving their personal opinions on the reliability of the forensic evidence in the cases. It also struck me that some of the observations they made lacked credibility.
I had entered the DFA from a scientific background and I personally knew some in our own professional State forensic service, especially the deputy head, Dr Tim Creedon, who had undertaken post graduate research in the Biochemistry Department of Trinity College Dublin at the same time as myself.
I then made the suggestion internally to the head of the Anglo-Irish Division, Dermot Gallagher, that we submit all the information we had on the Birmingham Six case to our own scientists. It had come up for Appeal at that time. They could give us a professional opinion of the strength of the evidence against the Six. Dermot immediately agreed and we got Ministerial approval.
I contacted Tim Creedon, and a meeting was arranged whereby I would show all that was on our files on that case to the head of the Forensic Science Lab, Dr Donovan. The meeting took place at Garda HQ in the Phoenix Park. The Minister for Justice, Gerry Collins, had earlier heard about the meeting and insisted that a representative of his Department be present. This did not cause us any difficulty.
As I began to outline the thrust of the forensics in the Birmingham case, Donovan interjected to say he was very well aware of the details. He then stated bluntly that he believed theforensics in the case did not stand up to scrutiny. Some of it was either forged or totally incompetent. He added that this was widely known internationally among forensic science services. He said that the Birmingham Six case had put a dark cloud over the whole forensics area. It was regarded as a stain on those trying to engender trust and acceptance of forensics.He was emphatic on the subject matter.
I was taken aback at how forthright he was. I asked him how long he had been aware of the situation, and he replied for a considerable length. I asked him why he had not brought his views to the attention of the Government before, and he replied that he was never asked about it until then. I suspect that he also made the calculation that his views may not have been entirely welcome.
The fact somebody as eminent as Donovan made these observations removed any lingering hesitancy about the Government and the Departments of Justice and Foreign Affairs supporting the cases of those who were claiming miscarriages of justice. He had provided forensic evidence in a huge number of cases, including many which led to the conviction of Republican paramilitaries. I also remember discussing the cases some years earlier and having difficulty in convincing a politician that I believed that there was a pattern of miscarriages of justices in these cases. He said to me in all sincerity that “Some of them must be guilty”. After Jim Donovan made his remarks, the doubting Thomases disappeared, and the Irish Government could have no hesitancy on the matter.
It also demonstrates how silos operate within the public service and how damaging they can be to the general good when officials do not share their information.