Kevin Meagher reflects on what went wrong for SF in the recent election and what they need to do right in preparation for the next election.
As the party most closely associated with and supportive of Irish unity, the fate of Sinn Fein should matter to all United Irelanders, whether they vote for them or not.
So last November’s general election to the 34th Dáil was a disappointment, plain and simple. The party came second in the number of seats (39) – one ahead of Fine Gael (38), but nine adrift of Fianna Fail (48) – and slumped to third place in the popular vote (after coming first in 2020).
As the new FF-FG government takes shape – sans Sinn Fein – I offer the following advice in a spirit of ‘continuous improvement’ where – à la the airline industry – you look at areas that need strengthening and fix them.
Let’s start with what went wrong.
1) Reassurance. Did anyone seriously expect this century-old system of two-party rule in Dublin to crumble? Fine Gael and Fianna Fail and the hyper partisan Dublin cognoscenti were always going to fight to retain their privileged positions. While their persistent ‘othering’ of Sinn Fein – aided and abetted by Ireland’s comically biased national media – was clearly effective in tarnishing the party, particularly in the eyes of wavering older voters. (And, yes, I know – its sheer hypocrisy given the antecedents of both FF and FG themselves).
Yet politics is a contact sport and Sinn Fein should have predicted this disingenuousline of attack. The obvious pre-emptive measure was simple: Reassurance, reassurance, reassurance. A strategy of normalising their presence as a potential party of government was needed straight after the 2020 election. Doubly importantas they cannot expect a fair hearing in the Irish media. Much more effort was needed to court opinion among business leaders, bankers and investors, positioning Sinn Fein as credible stewards of a complex, modern economy that relies on international investment and, while rattling along at the macro level, does nowhere near enough to reward the Irish people at the micro.
2) Strategy. Allied to the above point, it is clear the republican movement is great at taking the long view – often the very long view – and also good at short-term tactical politics. It’s the bit in the middle that’s sometimes lacking, with Sinn Fein offering too little detail about what it would have actually done. Impressive interventions on housing and health came during the campaign, but these should have been announced and bedded-in much earlier, along with other key policies – with greater clarity about their priorities in office. (Their campaign never felt like it had the ‘tip of a spear’). As ever, SFs actual policy for bringing about Irish unity, or what it would look like, was undercooked.
3) Immigration. Three out of four Irish voters routinely tell pollsters they think the level of immigration into Ireland is too high. Significantly, this rises to five out of six Sinn Fein voters. Alas, the alarm bells in Sinn Fein HQ must be defective as the partyhas made little effort to get on the right side of public opinion in recent years, allowing themselves to be depicted as advocates of an unpopular, ultra-liberal, open-door approach. The issue hurts them more than any other party. What part of this do they not understand?
4) Don’t swing at every ball. The referendum on altering the Irish Constitution in March 2024, tinkering with some outdated definitions of family life, blew up in the government’s face when voters overwhelmingly rejected the idea, precipitating Leo Varadkar’s departure as taoiseach. Voters gave two fingers to both amendments, one by two-thirds, with the other by three-quarters. Close it was not. So why did Sinn Fein get so heavily involved in the campaign, given there was literally no upside to doing so. And why did they promise to re-run the vote? And did they not sense the mood of the country hardening against change?
Let me address my rhetorical questions. Sinn Fein presumably thought these were popular, progressive measures – broadening the definition of ‘family’ to include non-married couples and replacing a reference to women’s ‘life within the home’ – and wanted to be at the forefront of driving them through. Having lost, they made a kneejerk decision to commit to rerunning them with amended text. The first response was ill-judged as it turned out, but understandable. The second was just foolish. But it’s the third point – why did they not sense looming defeat – that should be the real worry.
5) Rallied too late. Sinn Fein spent the whole of 2024 taking on water, declining in the polls with no-one in the party publicly suggesting anything to stem the losses. Each time a poll came in another bit of their seemingly once-impregnable lead was eroded. They went from 37 percent in October 2022 to just 19 percent in the election. Without question, they managed a great final campaign, with a strong performance from Mary-Lou McDonald, but elections are not won at the eleventh hour (see point 1). A real-time autopsy was required about why they were losing support, but it just never came.
Okay, so here are a few suggestions for improvement.
1) There is scope to build. The obvious problem with Sinn Fein’s electoral performance over the past few years is that is that it’s been all foreplay and no sex. A firm lead over the other parties for four years, but when it really mattered on election day, the party drooped. The good news is that if it can climb as high as 37 percent, then there’s lots of potential ground to (re)capture. One of the features of Ireland’s STV system is that TDs can get elected by just a few thousand, so understanding the micro-targeting of voters (which SF doesn’t appear to) and using their greater resources to better effect are pretty obvious lessons. The party remains the principal opposition to FF-FG. Eventually voters will tire of the current arrangement and look for an alternative (the pendulum effect). That’s if the coalition doesn’t break apart before then, which must be a strong possibility. 2029 is the critical Irish election for United Irelanders. All efforts must go into winning then.
2) Sinn Fein needs a ‘Clause Four’ moment. Twenty-seven years on from the Good Friday Agreement, the party is still too easy to characterise as something abnormal(again, see point 1). The heavily confected pre-election coverage of the party’s various imbroglios around safeguarding was a godsend for the southern establishment. The passage of time will obviously shuffle some of the doubting voters off this mortal coil, but Sinn Fein should not wait for the electorate to catch it up. Seize the initiative and instigate some sort of breakpoint with the past. The reference to Clause Four is to Tony Blair’s modernisation of the British Labour Party in the mid-1990s. His decision to replace a loose commitment to large-scale nationalisation from the party’s 1918 constitution with a clearer definition of the party’s contemporary values proved a masterstroke, showing Labour was in tune with the times and that Blair was prepared to address any ambiguities that were holding it back. Sinn Fein needs a similar modernising moment, defining itself on its own terms – not on its opponents. But what would a powerful reforming symbol be?
3) Build credibility on the economy. Related to the above point, Sinn Fein needs to talk about the economy a lot more than it does. I searched in vain for a serious, considered intervention about the party’s direction of travel on the economy in recent years. Its 180-page election manifesto devoted just six pages to the economy, mostly a series of unambitious supply side tweaks. ‘Middle Ireland’ needs to hear SF say out loud that it understands how the country makes its money – courting US investment in ICT and Big Pharma – and that they would not do anything to endanger that low tax model and the 300,000 high-paid jobs it supports. (Doubly strange given Sinn Fein’s networks at the very highest levels of US politics and business could lend it enormous credibility in this endeavour). Bottom line? The party has simply not trudged the hard yards as a prospective party of government.
4) Focus on being a great opposition. Irish politics is only going to get more divisive, so box clever. Be more circumspect and keep on the right side of big issues. Learn from Keir Starmer’s victory in Britain. Sinn Fein needs to make themselves a small target. Develop a limited number of properly budgeted, practical policies around the cost of living and public services and talk about them endlessly. Also,beware the fate of the Scottish Nationalists and stay away from all the woke stuff. It’s proven to be their undoing in recent times. Keep the focus on highlighting government mistakes and make sure they take full blame for them. Don’t jump in the way again. And think about the pace of this next term. My own hunch is that this government won’t last five years. Be ready.
Kevin Meagher reflects on what went wrong for SF in the recent election and what they need to do right in preparation for the next election.
As the party most closely associated with and supportive of Irish unity, the fate of Sinn Fein should matter to all United Irelanders, whether they vote for them or not.
So last November’s general election to the 34th Dáil was a disappointment, plain and simple. The party came second in the number of seats (39) – one ahead of Fine Gael (38), but nine adrift of Fianna Fail (48) – and slumped to third place in the popular vote (after coming first in 2020).
As the new FF-FG government takes shape – sans Sinn Fein – I offer the following advice in a spirit of ‘continuous improvement’ where – à la the airline industry – you look at areas that need strengthening and fix them.
Let’s start with what went wrong.
1) Reassurance. Did anyone seriously expect this century-old system of two-party rule in Dublin to crumble? Fine Gael and Fianna Fail and the hyper partisan Dublin cognoscenti were always going to fight to retain their privileged positions. While their persistent ‘othering’ of Sinn Fein – aided and abetted by Ireland’s comically biased national media – was clearly effective in tarnishing the party, particularly in the eyes of wavering older voters. (And, yes, I know – its sheer hypocrisy given the antecedents of both FF and FG themselves).
Yet politics is a contact sport and Sinn Fein should have predicted this disingenuousline of attack. The obvious pre-emptive measure was simple: Reassurance, reassurance, reassurance. A strategy of normalising their presence as a potential party of government was needed straight after the 2020 election. Doubly importantas they cannot expect a fair hearing in the Irish media. Much more effort was needed to court opinion among business leaders, bankers and investors, positioning Sinn Fein as credible stewards of a complex, modern economy that relies on international investment and, while rattling along at the macro level, does nowhere near enough to reward the Irish people at the micro.
2) Strategy. Allied to the above point, it is clear the republican movement is great at taking the long view – often the very long view – and also good at short-term tactical politics. It’s the bit in the middle that’s sometimes lacking, with Sinn Fein offering too little detail about what it would have actually done. Impressive interventions on housing and health came during the campaign, but these should have been announced and bedded-in much earlier, along with other key policies – with greater clarity about their priorities in office. (Their campaign never felt like it had the ‘tip of a spear’). As ever, SFs actual policy for bringing about Irish unity, or what it would look like, was undercooked.
3) Immigration. Three out of four Irish voters routinely tell pollsters they think the level of immigration into Ireland is too high. Significantly, this rises to five out of six Sinn Fein voters. Alas, the alarm bells in Sinn Fein HQ must be defective as the partyhas made little effort to get on the right side of public opinion in recent years, allowing themselves to be depicted as advocates of an unpopular, ultra-liberal, open-door approach. The issue hurts them more than any other party. What part of this do they not understand?
4) Don’t swing at every ball. The referendum on altering the Irish Constitution in March 2024, tinkering with some outdated definitions of family life, blew up in the government’s face when voters overwhelmingly rejected the idea, precipitating Leo Varadkar’s departure as taoiseach. Voters gave two fingers to both amendments, one by two-thirds, with the other by three-quarters. Close it was not. So why did Sinn Fein get so heavily involved in the campaign, given there was literally no upside to doing so. And why did they promise to re-run the vote? And did they not sense the mood of the country hardening against change?
Let me address my rhetorical questions. Sinn Fein presumably thought these were popular, progressive measures – broadening the definition of ‘family’ to include non-married couples and replacing a reference to women’s ‘life within the home’ – and wanted to be at the forefront of driving them through. Having lost, they made a kneejerk decision to commit to rerunning them with amended text. The first response was ill-judged as it turned out, but understandable. The second was just foolish. But it’s the third point – why did they not sense looming defeat – that should be the real worry.
5) Rallied too late. Sinn Fein spent the whole of 2024 taking on water, declining in the polls with no-one in the party publicly suggesting anything to stem the losses. Each time a poll came in another bit of their seemingly once-impregnable lead was eroded. They went from 37 percent in October 2022 to just 19 percent in the election. Without question, they managed a great final campaign, with a strong performance from Mary-Lou McDonald, but elections are not won at the eleventh hour (see point 1). A real-time autopsy was required about why they were losing support, but it just never came.
Okay, so here are a few suggestions for improvement.
1) There is scope to build. The obvious problem with Sinn Fein’s electoral performance over the past few years is that is that it’s been all foreplay and no sex. A firm lead over the other parties for four years, but when it really mattered on election day, the party drooped. The good news is that if it can climb as high as 37 percent, then there’s lots of potential ground to (re)capture. One of the features of Ireland’s STV system is that TDs can get elected by just a few thousand, so understanding the micro-targeting of voters (which SF doesn’t appear to) and using their greater resources to better effect are pretty obvious lessons. The party remains the principal opposition to FF-FG. Eventually voters will tire of the current arrangement and look for an alternative (the pendulum effect). That’s if the coalition doesn’t break apart before then, which must be a strong possibility. 2029 is the critical Irish election for United Irelanders. All efforts must go into winning then.
2) Sinn Fein needs a ‘Clause Four’ moment. Twenty-seven years on from the Good Friday Agreement, the party is still too easy to characterise as something abnormal(again, see point 1). The heavily confected pre-election coverage of the party’s various imbroglios around safeguarding was a godsend for the southern establishment. The passage of time will obviously shuffle some of the doubting voters off this mortal coil, but Sinn Fein should not wait for the electorate to catch it up. Seize the initiative and instigate some sort of breakpoint with the past. The reference to Clause Four is to Tony Blair’s modernisation of the British Labour Party in the mid-1990s. His decision to replace a loose commitment to large-scale nationalisation from the party’s 1918 constitution with a clearer definition of the party’s contemporary values proved a masterstroke, showing Labour was in tune with the times and that Blair was prepared to address any ambiguities that were holding it back. Sinn Fein needs a similar modernising moment, defining itself on its own terms – not on its opponents. But what would a powerful reforming symbol be?
3) Build credibility on the economy. Related to the above point, Sinn Fein needs to talk about the economy a lot more than it does. I searched in vain for a serious, considered intervention about the party’s direction of travel on the economy in recent years. Its 180-page election manifesto devoted just six pages to the economy, mostly a series of unambitious supply side tweaks. ‘Middle Ireland’ needs to hear SF say out loud that it understands how the country makes its money – courting US investment in ICT and Big Pharma – and that they would not do anything to endanger that low tax model and the 300,000 high-paid jobs it supports. (Doubly strange given Sinn Fein’s networks at the very highest levels of US politics and business could lend it enormous credibility in this endeavour). Bottom line? The party has simply not trudged the hard yards as a prospective party of government.
4) Focus on being a great opposition. Irish politics is only going to get more divisive, so box clever. Be more circumspect and keep on the right side of big issues. Learn from Keir Starmer’s victory in Britain. Sinn Fein needs to make themselves a small target. Develop a limited number of properly budgeted, practical policies around the cost of living and public services and talk about them endlessly. Also,beware the fate of the Scottish Nationalists and stay away from all the woke stuff. It’s proven to be their undoing in recent times. Keep the focus on highlighting government mistakes and make sure they take full blame for them. Don’t jump in the way again. And think about the pace of this next term. My own hunch is that this government won’t last five years. Be ready.