If Tony Blair and Mo Mowlam represented a totally new and refreshing approach to Ireland, then her successor as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Mandelson, was a step right back into the dark past. He was, without doubt, a major figure in British Labour, just like Mo, but nowhere nearly as popular in the party. He was one of the creators of New Labour to distinguish it from the failures of the party under the previous leaders. He was a big fish, seeking to rebuild his political career at the NIO after the Geoffrey Robinson loan scandal, where Mandelson had been less than candid about the circumstances of a personal loan to purchase his house in Islington.
The Mandelson appointment reflected the importance which Blair placed on Northern Ireland. It had become obvious that Mo’s capacity was diminishing as the effect of her brain tumour became more pronounced. The British government needed a strong political figure in Belfast to manage the tricky post-Agreement implementation. The issue of growing Unionist dissatisfaction with the new situation had to be tackled and it had to be conceded that Mo had lost the confidence of the main Unionist Party. In addition, Blair felt that he could put his trusted ally, Mandelson, into the NIO and it would take the pressure off himself. He had essentially lost faith in Mo. Blair was also concerned that Mo had been unduly pro-Nationalist and felt it was time for a change.
Mandelson decided from the very start to operate on the basis of currying favour with David Trimble and his party. He indicated from the outset that our previous cosy relations with Mo would no longer continue. I suppose he hoped that would please the Ulster Unionists.
He was openly disdainful of the other groups, particularly those with working-class backgrounds. He had a poor relationship with his Irish counterparts, David Andrews and then Brian Cowen. The poor opinion was reciprocated on the Irish side, neither Irish Minister liked him or felt that Mandelson was interested in partnership with Dublin.
In mannerism and general attitude, Mandelson was very like his Tory predecessors. His big supporter in Dublin was the British Ambassador, Ivor Roberts, a rude and aggressive individual who had hitched his star to Mandelson, on the widespread belief that Mandelson would be the next British Foreign Secretary. Roberts was very unpopular with the Anglo-Irish Division in DFA.
On his first visit to Dublin and to Iveagh House, Mandelson and party were accompanied by his Ambassador. The initial greeting in the foyer was a bit farcical, when Andrews, arrived late and mistook one of the accompanying officials for Mandelson. I am not sure even today as to whether Andrews did this on purpose, or it was a genuine error. Andrews went on at some length about how happy he was to meet Mandelson, while vigorously shaking the poor perplexed official’s hand. It took a few minutes to clear up the confusion and when Roberts tried to explain, Andrews brushed him aside and said, you should have spoken up.
The Ministers, both Andrews and Mandelson, were to adjourn to the Ministerial office for a meeting. Andrews asked me to physically prevent Roberts from joining the group. He wanted a meeting between Ministers on their own. I stood in the doorway and Roberts tried to jostle me out of the way, but I stood my ground and prevented the Ambassador from going through the door. The jostle continued for a short while, but to me, it seemed like an eternity.
Andrews witnessed the event and threw me a wry smile as he sat down for his talk with Mandelson and I shut the door. Meanwhile out in the anteroom I continued to deny Roberts any access. He threatened all types of retaliation to me personally and British-Irish relations. As with a lot of Andrews’s meetings, it was fairly short, and Mandelson emerged to rejoin Roberts. In our postmortem after the British delegation had departed, Andrews heaped great praise on me. I replied that I had no intention of doing anything similar in the future. My job description did not extend to wrestling with British Ambassadors.
If Roberts lodged a protest at his exclusion, it would have gone no further. Afterwards, I seemed to have been dropped from the invitation lists to social events at Glencairn, the British Ambassador’s palatial mansion in South Dublin. However, no lasting damage was done to Anglo-Irish relations.
When Andrews was replaced by Brian Cowen, who was regarded as a rising star within Fianna Fáil, there was hope for an improved relationship with Mandelson. Unfortunately, that hope did not last long. The two Ministers chaired talks in Belfast with the various parties. Cowen was hugely interested in the Peace Process and determined to work hard to implement the Good Friday Agreement. He certainly was interested in establishing good personal relations with Mandelson. However, it was not reciprocated.
I accompanied Cowen to most of these meetings. He was hugely engaged and knowledgeable on the North, as he had family connections with County Armagh. He soon established a good working relationship with the various parties. Mandelson gave the impression he could not care less about any group other than the Ulster Unionists. He barely spoke to the PUP and when he did it was often with sarcasm. At one meeting their leadership, David Ervine and Billy Hutchinson, mentioned that they had received an invitation to attend President Clinton’s 2000 reception in Washington for St Patrick’s Day. They were short of funds to make the trip and wondered whether the British government might assist them. Mandelson sneered at them, basically questioning why they should attend. He turned to a young delegate who was acting as their notetaker and pointed at him and said, “I suppose you will want to take even this scribbler along.”
Cowen intervened and said that the Irish government would assist the PUP and he would talk to them afterwards. Shortly after the meeting, a small group from the PUP came to the Irish government delegation to report that the NIO had a sudden change of heart and were now fully funding their visit to Washington. Ervine was in no doubt, but that Cowen’s intervention had secured them the necessary leverage with Mandelson.
Mandelson could also be rude and dismissive of Sinn Féin and the SDLP. At many of the meetings with individual parties, he exuded an air of sullen indifference and often remained silent, relying on Cowen to engage with the local politicians but the Irish government battles with Mandelson were only beginning.
Relations between the two Ministers were not helped when in May 2000, a NIO document was leaked which was regarded as reflecting Mandelson’s view. The document attacked Cowen as a Green nationalist with no understanding of Unionist concerns.[1]
As somebody who worked closely with Brian Cowen over a number of years, this description is totally inaccurate and unfair. Cowen was forced on occasions to point out to Mandelson that there was a need for balance in the British government’s approach. The Peace Process needed to be embedded in both communities. In fact, in my experience, Cowen was probably more robust in his dealings with Sinn Féin than many other Southern politicians.
There were difficult exchanges with Mandelson over the Patten Report on Policing in the North, which are covered in a later Chapter.
[1] McAdam, Noel (2000) “UUP meets over leaked memo on “Green” Cowen”, Belfast Telegraph, 5 May.
Mandelson’s Motivation
I am not sure why Mandelson took such an insensitive position to Irish Nationalism. Some in the Irish government suggested that it was a family tradition. I have read extracts from the Irish government archives of the 1940s which mention the pro-Unionist attitude of Mandelson’s grandfather Herbert Morrison, a major figure in British politics and a former Deputy Prime Minister and British Foreign Secretary.[1] Morrison, a lifelong imperialist, approved the controversial US–UK overthrow of the democratic regime of Mohammad Mosaddeq in Iran.[2]
It has been claimed that Morrison inspired a young Peter Mandelson to join the Labour Party and may have passed on Morrison’s prejudices against Dublin. I am not so sure.
I believe that Mandelson during his time in Belfast simply took the strategic decision to distance himself from the legacy of Mo Mowlam. He wanted to make a name for himself and decided that rebalancing policy and showing a distinct bias towards Unionists best suited his ambition. Mandelson was quoted as describing Tony Blair as his own Secretary of State during Mo’s period in Belfast, thus belittling the huge contribution his predecessor made to the Peace Process.
In fact, earlier in his career Mandelson is on record as supporting Irish Unity. Mandelson told a fringe meeting of the Labour conference in Blackpool in 1994:
I happen to believe in the goal of Irish Unity. But it is up to the people of Northern Ireland in particular to decide their own future. I think they should look to their own parties, their own political processes, their own relationships, to determine for themselves what sort of future they want.[3]
I am not sure how sincere that declaration was but others, who knew Mandelson in earlier times, speak with warmth of his affection for Ireland.
As Secretary of State, Mandelson seemed uninterested that he was alienating just about every group in the North, apart from the Ulster Unionists. Still, I was somewhat surprised at the level of the Loyalist animosity towards him. He had an uncanny ability to alienate people. It was no surprise that he had such a topsy-turvy career in government. His relationship with David Trimble deteriorated and by the end there was no love lost between them.
However, in the final analysis Mandelson was a substantial figure, and he did help stabilise the Unionists at a particularly sensitive time. His old nemesis, Brian Cowen, acknowledged that when Mandelson was forced to resign after revelations about his failure to tell the truth about lobbying on a naturalisation matter.
Relations between Mandelson and Tony Blair had also become fraught towards the end of his time in Northern Ireland. Mandelson privately opposed Blair’s efforts to meet Republican demands in order to convince them to engage in decommissioning. Blair began to feel that Mandelson, just like Mo, had become too associated with one of the protagonists in the North, in his case the Unionists.
In the end, Mandelson was somewhat bitter about his time in the North. In an interview with the Guardian on 13 March 2007, Mandelson criticised Tony Blair stating that the former Prime Minister had demonstrated “unreasonable and irresponsible” behaviour in his dealings with Republicans. He added secondly, and more importantly, it was calculated to push the Unionists off the other end of the table. So, in order to keep the Republicans at the table, they would be constantly tugging the blanket their way, I would say, they’re having too much of the blanket. We’ve got to allow the Unionists to tug it back a bit.
In typical Mandelson style, he later denied the quote prompting the newspaper to publish the full interview. Mandelson had a way of dividing opinion wherever he went.
I freely admit that Mandelson was not my cup of tea. I felt he viewed himself as always being the cleverest person in the room and he overestimated his own ability. On the Irish side, we never wanted to view Mandelson as our foe but I fear he saw Dublin as an obstacle to his ambition of outshining Mo Mowlam and enhancing his own standing. It was a pity because he squandered a lot of goodwill on the altar of his own ambition. His goal to rebuild his career at the NIO also was a failure.
I do not think that Peter Mandelson could be regarded as a friend of Ireland.
[1] Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Vol VIII, p. 226.
[2] Taylor, Jack (2023) “How Britain Crushed Democracy in Iran”, Tribune Magazine, 19 August.
[3] Mullin, John (1999) “Mandelson unity remarks queried”, Guardian, 18 October.
If Tony Blair and Mo Mowlam represented a totally new and refreshing approach to Ireland, then her successor as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Mandelson, was a step right back into the dark past. He was, without doubt, a major figure in British Labour, just like Mo, but nowhere nearly as popular in the party. He was one of the creators of New Labour to distinguish it from the failures of the party under the previous leaders. He was a big fish, seeking to rebuild his political career at the NIO after the Geoffrey Robinson loan scandal, where Mandelson had been less than candid about the circumstances of a personal loan to purchase his house in Islington.
The Mandelson appointment reflected the importance which Blair placed on Northern Ireland. It had become obvious that Mo’s capacity was diminishing as the effect of her brain tumour became more pronounced. The British government needed a strong political figure in Belfast to manage the tricky post-Agreement implementation. The issue of growing Unionist dissatisfaction with the new situation had to be tackled and it had to be conceded that Mo had lost the confidence of the main Unionist Party. In addition, Blair felt that he could put his trusted ally, Mandelson, into the NIO and it would take the pressure off himself. He had essentially lost faith in Mo. Blair was also concerned that Mo had been unduly pro-Nationalist and felt it was time for a change.
Mandelson decided from the very start to operate on the basis of currying favour with David Trimble and his party. He indicated from the outset that our previous cosy relations with Mo would no longer continue. I suppose he hoped that would please the Ulster Unionists.
He was openly disdainful of the other groups, particularly those with working-class backgrounds. He had a poor relationship with his Irish counterparts, David Andrews and then Brian Cowen. The poor opinion was reciprocated on the Irish side, neither Irish Minister liked him or felt that Mandelson was interested in partnership with Dublin.
In mannerism and general attitude, Mandelson was very like his Tory predecessors. His big supporter in Dublin was the British Ambassador, Ivor Roberts, a rude and aggressive individual who had hitched his star to Mandelson, on the widespread belief that Mandelson would be the next British Foreign Secretary. Roberts was very unpopular with the Anglo-Irish Division in DFA.
On his first visit to Dublin and to Iveagh House, Mandelson and party were accompanied by his Ambassador. The initial greeting in the foyer was a bit farcical, when Andrews, arrived late and mistook one of the accompanying officials for Mandelson. I am not sure even today as to whether Andrews did this on purpose, or it was a genuine error. Andrews went on at some length about how happy he was to meet Mandelson, while vigorously shaking the poor perplexed official’s hand. It took a few minutes to clear up the confusion and when Roberts tried to explain, Andrews brushed him aside and said, you should have spoken up.
The Ministers, both Andrews and Mandelson, were to adjourn to the Ministerial office for a meeting. Andrews asked me to physically prevent Roberts from joining the group. He wanted a meeting between Ministers on their own. I stood in the doorway and Roberts tried to jostle me out of the way, but I stood my ground and prevented the Ambassador from going through the door. The jostle continued for a short while, but to me, it seemed like an eternity.
Andrews witnessed the event and threw me a wry smile as he sat down for his talk with Mandelson and I shut the door. Meanwhile out in the anteroom I continued to deny Roberts any access. He threatened all types of retaliation to me personally and British-Irish relations. As with a lot of Andrews’s meetings, it was fairly short, and Mandelson emerged to rejoin Roberts. In our postmortem after the British delegation had departed, Andrews heaped great praise on me. I replied that I had no intention of doing anything similar in the future. My job description did not extend to wrestling with British Ambassadors.
If Roberts lodged a protest at his exclusion, it would have gone no further. Afterwards, I seemed to have been dropped from the invitation lists to social events at Glencairn, the British Ambassador’s palatial mansion in South Dublin. However, no lasting damage was done to Anglo-Irish relations.
When Andrews was replaced by Brian Cowen, who was regarded as a rising star within Fianna Fáil, there was hope for an improved relationship with Mandelson. Unfortunately, that hope did not last long. The two Ministers chaired talks in Belfast with the various parties. Cowen was hugely interested in the Peace Process and determined to work hard to implement the Good Friday Agreement. He certainly was interested in establishing good personal relations with Mandelson. However, it was not reciprocated.
I accompanied Cowen to most of these meetings. He was hugely engaged and knowledgeable on the North, as he had family connections with County Armagh. He soon established a good working relationship with the various parties. Mandelson gave the impression he could not care less about any group other than the Ulster Unionists. He barely spoke to the PUP and when he did it was often with sarcasm. At one meeting their leadership, David Ervine and Billy Hutchinson, mentioned that they had received an invitation to attend President Clinton’s 2000 reception in Washington for St Patrick’s Day. They were short of funds to make the trip and wondered whether the British government might assist them. Mandelson sneered at them, basically questioning why they should attend. He turned to a young delegate who was acting as their notetaker and pointed at him and said, “I suppose you will want to take even this scribbler along.”
Cowen intervened and said that the Irish government would assist the PUP and he would talk to them afterwards. Shortly after the meeting, a small group from the PUP came to the Irish government delegation to report that the NIO had a sudden change of heart and were now fully funding their visit to Washington. Ervine was in no doubt, but that Cowen’s intervention had secured them the necessary leverage with Mandelson.
Mandelson could also be rude and dismissive of Sinn Féin and the SDLP. At many of the meetings with individual parties, he exuded an air of sullen indifference and often remained silent, relying on Cowen to engage with the local politicians but the Irish government battles with Mandelson were only beginning.
Relations between the two Ministers were not helped when in May 2000, a NIO document was leaked which was regarded as reflecting Mandelson’s view. The document attacked Cowen as a Green nationalist with no understanding of Unionist concerns.[1]
As somebody who worked closely with Brian Cowen over a number of years, this description is totally inaccurate and unfair. Cowen was forced on occasions to point out to Mandelson that there was a need for balance in the British government’s approach. The Peace Process needed to be embedded in both communities. In fact, in my experience, Cowen was probably more robust in his dealings with Sinn Féin than many other Southern politicians.
There were difficult exchanges with Mandelson over the Patten Report on Policing in the North, which are covered in a later Chapter.
[1] McAdam, Noel (2000) “UUP meets over leaked memo on “Green” Cowen”, Belfast Telegraph, 5 May.
Mandelson’s Motivation
I am not sure why Mandelson took such an insensitive position to Irish Nationalism. Some in the Irish government suggested that it was a family tradition. I have read extracts from the Irish government archives of the 1940s which mention the pro-Unionist attitude of Mandelson’s grandfather Herbert Morrison, a major figure in British politics and a former Deputy Prime Minister and British Foreign Secretary.[1] Morrison, a lifelong imperialist, approved the controversial US–UK overthrow of the democratic regime of Mohammad Mosaddeq in Iran.[2]
It has been claimed that Morrison inspired a young Peter Mandelson to join the Labour Party and may have passed on Morrison’s prejudices against Dublin. I am not so sure.
I believe that Mandelson during his time in Belfast simply took the strategic decision to distance himself from the legacy of Mo Mowlam. He wanted to make a name for himself and decided that rebalancing policy and showing a distinct bias towards Unionists best suited his ambition. Mandelson was quoted as describing Tony Blair as his own Secretary of State during Mo’s period in Belfast, thus belittling the huge contribution his predecessor made to the Peace Process.
In fact, earlier in his career Mandelson is on record as supporting Irish Unity. Mandelson told a fringe meeting of the Labour conference in Blackpool in 1994:
I happen to believe in the goal of Irish Unity. But it is up to the people of Northern Ireland in particular to decide their own future. I think they should look to their own parties, their own political processes, their own relationships, to determine for themselves what sort of future they want.[3]
I am not sure how sincere that declaration was but others, who knew Mandelson in earlier times, speak with warmth of his affection for Ireland.
As Secretary of State, Mandelson seemed uninterested that he was alienating just about every group in the North, apart from the Ulster Unionists. Still, I was somewhat surprised at the level of the Loyalist animosity towards him. He had an uncanny ability to alienate people. It was no surprise that he had such a topsy-turvy career in government. His relationship with David Trimble deteriorated and by the end there was no love lost between them.
However, in the final analysis Mandelson was a substantial figure, and he did help stabilise the Unionists at a particularly sensitive time. His old nemesis, Brian Cowen, acknowledged that when Mandelson was forced to resign after revelations about his failure to tell the truth about lobbying on a naturalisation matter.
Relations between Mandelson and Tony Blair had also become fraught towards the end of his time in Northern Ireland. Mandelson privately opposed Blair’s efforts to meet Republican demands in order to convince them to engage in decommissioning. Blair began to feel that Mandelson, just like Mo, had become too associated with one of the protagonists in the North, in his case the Unionists.
In the end, Mandelson was somewhat bitter about his time in the North. In an interview with the Guardian on 13 March 2007, Mandelson criticised Tony Blair stating that the former Prime Minister had demonstrated “unreasonable and irresponsible” behaviour in his dealings with Republicans. He added secondly, and more importantly, it was calculated to push the Unionists off the other end of the table. So, in order to keep the Republicans at the table, they would be constantly tugging the blanket their way, I would say, they’re having too much of the blanket. We’ve got to allow the Unionists to tug it back a bit.
In typical Mandelson style, he later denied the quote prompting the newspaper to publish the full interview. Mandelson had a way of dividing opinion wherever he went.
I freely admit that Mandelson was not my cup of tea. I felt he viewed himself as always being the cleverest person in the room and he overestimated his own ability. On the Irish side, we never wanted to view Mandelson as our foe but I fear he saw Dublin as an obstacle to his ambition of outshining Mo Mowlam and enhancing his own standing. It was a pity because he squandered a lot of goodwill on the altar of his own ambition. His goal to rebuild his career at the NIO also was a failure.
I do not think that Peter Mandelson could be regarded as a friend of Ireland.
[1] Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Vol VIII, p. 226.
[2] Taylor, Jack (2023) “How Britain Crushed Democracy in Iran”, Tribune Magazine, 19 August.
[3] Mullin, John (1999) “Mandelson unity remarks queried”, Guardian, 18 October.